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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PRACTICED IN
STATE COURTS
JOHN B. MCCONAUGHY*
Many lawyers assume that only in international courts
or in national courts do important questions of international
law arise. Many cases, however, arising in state courts pre-
sent interesting and important questions of international law.
Some of these questions are: the existence of war including
its beginning and its termination; conflicts between treaties
and state laws; the rights of aliens; validity of foreign judg-
ments; and suits by or against foreign sovereigns.
The question of the existence of war comes before the state
courts most often because of life insurance policies which
have war clauses. These policies often contain provisions for
the payment of double indemnity in case of accidental death
but such payment of double indemnity is excluded if the in-
sured was engaged in military or naval service in time of
war. The first of these cases arising from World War II
was West v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co.1 before the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. The life of Broadus F.
West was insured under two policies issued by the appellant.
The policies provided double indemnity in case of accidental
death but excluded such double indemnity if the insured was
"engaged in military or naval service in time of war," together
with other reductions of the liability of the company in such
case. The insured was enlisted in the United States Navy
and was killed at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, by Jap-
anese bombers together with approximately thirty-five hun-
dred others.
The South Carolina Court held that the insured was not
killed in time of war and that the beneficiary could therefore
collect the double indemnity benefits of the policy. The Court
said :2
It is seen from the following authorities that the decla-
ration by Congress of War on Japan on December 8 was
the only legal way in which the country could be placed
*Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of South
Carolina.
1. 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. 2d 475 (1943).
2. 202 S. C. 422, 427, 25 S. E. 2d 475, 477 (1943).
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in a state of war with that aggressor nation. The Consti-
tution so provides, Art. I, Sec. 8, supra. That the policy
contracts were entered into in contemplation of that clear
law, and subject to it, cannot be denied; and they are
bound by it.
The holding of the South Carolina Court was followed in
Idaho,3 Hawaii, 4 and in one federal court.5 In the Idaho case,
however, Justice Ailshie wrote a strong dissenting opinion"
in which he quoted President Roosevelt's Message to Congress
as follows:
I ask that the Congress declare that, since the unpro-
voked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, Decem-
ber 7, a state of war has existed between the United
States and the Japanese Empire."
The opposite view of the beginning of the war was taken
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit in
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bennions and this decision
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court when it
denied the petition for appeal.9 Justice Murrah cited the
Prize Cases'0 which had held that President Lincoln's Procla-
mation of the Blockade of the Southern States commenced
the War between the States without any declaration of war
by Congress. He also stated that the battles of Palo Alta
and Resada de la Palma had been fought before the passage
of the Act of Congress declaring War on Mexico on May 13,
1846 which recognized "a state of war as existing by the act of
the Republic of Mexico."'"
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Stankus v. New
York Life Ins. Co.'2 had reached the same opinion as the U. S.
Circuit Court in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bennion.13
This Massachusetts case was an action by the beneficiary to
3. Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P. 2d 227
(1944).
4. Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 37 Hawaii 208, 14 C. C. H. LIFE
CODES 496 (1945).
5. Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W. D.
La. 1944).
6. Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P. 2d 227
(1944).
7. 87 CONG. REC. 9504-9505 (1941).
8. 158 F. 2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
9. 331 U. S. 811 (1947).
10. 67 U. S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
11. 9 STAT. 9 (1846).
12. 312 Mass. 366, 55 N. E. 2d 687 (1942).
13. See note 8, supra.
[Vol. 10
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss2/1
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN STATE COURTS
recover double indemnity under a policy of life insurance
which provided that such double indemnity could not be re-
covered if "insured's death resulted directly or indirectly,
from . . .war or any act incident thereto." The insured, a
seaman in the U. S. Navy and a member of the crew of the
destroyer U. S. S. Rueben James, was lost at sea when his
ship was torpedoed during the night of October 30, 1941,
while convoying in the North Atlantic west of Iceland. The
court held that the death was due to the war going on which
the United States had not as yet entered. Justice Ronan, how-
ever, stated:
But the existence of war is not dependent upon a for-
mal declaration of war. Wars are being waged today
that began without any formal declaration of war. The
attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941 is the latest illustration. This is not a modern
method for it has been-said that, from out of one hundred
and eighteen wars that occurred between 1700 and 1872,
in hardly ten did formal declarations precede the com-
mencement of hostilities. (Phillipson, International Law
and the Great War, p. 53.)
Although Justice Ronan's opinion might be considered dic-
tum since the above case was not decided upon the question
of whether the United States had entered the war, yet it is
submitted that his opinion is excellent international law.
It is seen that we are faced with a lack of uniformity among
the state and federal court decisions as to when World War II
started. If the beneficiaries of a soldier or sailor were to sue
for recovery of double indemnity in the courts of South Caro-
lina, Idaho, Hawaii, or one of the District Courts of Louisi-
ana on the life of an insured who was killed at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, they could recover such double in-
demnity even though there were a war clause because these
courts have decided that the United States was not at war
on December 7, 1941. Other beneficiaries, holding the same
insurance policy and under the same conditions, could not
recover if they sued in the Massachusetts courts or in other
federal courts. It is true that in the case of doubt as to the
interpretation of insurance policies, such policies are to be
interpreted in favor of the beneficiary, but it is submitted
that according to international law there is no reasonable
doubt but that World War II commenced with the Japanese
1958]
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attack on Pearl Harbor and not subsequently with the declara-
tion of war on December 8, 1941.
Lauterpact's Oppenheirn14 points out that war commences
upon the commission of an act of force under the authority
of the state which is done with hostile intent or if not done
with hostile intent is accepted by the state which is attacked
as an act of war by repelling the force or by declaration
which in the absence of a statement designating the time
of commencement is retroactive to the first act of force. 15
Oppenheim'O points out that the following wars started
with no formal declaration of war, namely: (1) The Russo-
Japanese War of 1904 which began when Japanese torpedo
boats attacked Russian men-of-war at Port Arthur; (2) the
war between Italy and Abyssinia of 1935 which was never de-
clared and which started with an attack by Italian forces;
(3) Japan with China in 1937; (4) Germany with Poland
(1939); (5) Russia with Finland (1939) ; and (6) Japan with
the United States, commencing with the attack on Pearl Har-
bor of December 7, 1941.
Hyde17 points out that war may come into existence by
hostile acts directed by one country against another with the
design of making war. He says that a state may suddenly
attack without warning another state and employ its whole
military strength against the defending state as a means of
obtaining what it could not obtain by a declaration, namely
the element of surprise.
Borchard'8 in commenting upon the commencement of
World War II states:
All the Congressmen who spoke before 4:10 P.M. on
December 8, assumed that war was in existence and the
request of the President had read 'I ask that Congress
declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack
by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has ex-
isted between the United States and the Japanese Em-
pire'.
14. 2 Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (6th rev. ed. 1944).
15. Cf. McNair in 11 GROTIUS SocIETY 45 (1926); and Rumpf in 18
B. U. L. REv. 686-714 (1938).
16. 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 14, at 236.
17. 3 C. C. Hyde, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE U. S. 1693 (1947).
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The President and Congress clearly intended that the Dec-
laration of War should be retroactive to the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The President made this clear in his Message to
Congress asking Congress to declare war.19 Congress in its
Declaration of War 20 stated:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
that the state of war between the United States and the
Imperial Government of Japan which has been thrust
upon the United States is hereby formally declared.
It is believed that the intentions of the President and Con-
gress in this respect should be binding upon the courts but
since some state courts have decided that a war does not com-
mence until Congress formally declares it, it would be ad-
visable for attorneys employed by insurance companies to
advise their clients that in place of the war clause limiting
recovery in double indemnity that an attack clause should be
inserted in future life insurance contracts which would read
as follows:
No double indemnity will be paid for accidental death
if such death results directly or indirectly from military,
naval, aerial, or atomic attacks upon the United States
or its military, naval, or aerial bases and fortifications.
It is unlikely that any future world war will commence by
formal declaration because of the importance of surprise to an
aggressor state and the devastation that could be brought
about by an aerial atomic attack. Minor wars may be com-
menced by formal declaration.
Another question which has puzzled the state courts is the
termination of war. In Greenville Enterprise v. Jennings,
2 1
the South Carolina Legislature had passed a statute 2 2 pro-
viding that it should be lawful to exhibit publicly motion
pictures, athletic sports, and musical concerts on Sunday in
counties wherein the United States Government had estab-
lished and maintained permanent or temporary army forts,
naval or marine bases. The act was to expire six months after
the present war ended. A group of persons, including minis-
ters, sought in 1947 to bring these Sunday amusements to an
end in South Carolina by claiming that the war had ended
19. 87 CONG. REC. 9504-9505 (1941).
20. 87 CONG. REC. 9750 (1941).
21. 210 S. C. 163, 41 S. E. 2d 868 (1947).
22. S. C. CODE 1942, § 1737-1.
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more than six months previously and that therefore the per-
missive act had expired. After quoting its decision in West
v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co. 23 that war can only come
into being by a formal declaration of war by Congress and
that the commencement of war is at the time that Congress
declares it, a concept contrary to international law, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that the war had not yet
come to an end because Congress had not formally declared
an end to the war. Although the reasoning in the case based
upon a formal declaration by Congress of the commencement
of war is erroneous according to international law, yet the
Court was correct in finding that an armistice did not end
the war and that some more formal action was necessary.
In Mutual Life Ins. of New York v. Davis24 which was de-
cided by the Court of Appeals of Georgia, an army officer
was killed as a result of an explosion of an ammunition dump
in Germany on August 19, 1945, or four days after the sur-
render of Japan. The Court held that the insured was not
killed in time of war within the meaning of the life policy
excluding double indemnity if the death of the "insured re-
sulted from military or naval service in time of war or from
any act incident to war."
Lauterpact's Oppenheim25 states that war may be termi-
nated in three different ways: (1) By abstention from further
acts of war without making peace through a special treaty;
(2) By a special treaty of peace; and (3) Through complete
subjugation of the adversary. Hyde 26 adds a fourth method,
namely, formal declaration of the termination of war by one
party and gives as an example the joint resolution passed
by Congress on May 15, 1920, terminating the state of war
with Germany. This was followed by the Treaty of Berlin
signed on August 25, 1921.27
The final surrender terms with Germany were signed in
Berlin on May 8, 1945.28 This was the armistice. Japan signed
the armistice with the United States aboard the battleship
23. 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. 2d 475, 45 A. L. R. 1461 (1943).
24. 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S. E. 2d 571 (1949).
25. 2 Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464 (6th rev. ed. 1944).
26. 2 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 17, para. 905.
27. Cf. 16 AM. J. INT'L L. Suppl. 10-13 (1922), and Hudson, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 1029-1045 (1926). On Sept. 3, 1919, the Parliament of China
resolved that a state of peace between Germany and China had been
restored, and this was followed by a treaty between Germany and China
on May 20, 1921. (L. N. T. S., p. 272).
28. 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 581 (1945).
[Vol. 10
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Missouri on September 2, 1945.29 Although the armistice with
Germany was signed in 1945, the war between the United
States and Germany continued for six more years until it was
finally terminated on October 19, 1951, by Joint Resolution
of Congress. 30 The War Between the United States and Japan
continued for almost seven years after the Armistice was
signed until April 28, 1952, when it was brought to an end
by the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty.3 1
It was on this date that President Truman issued his Procla-
mation of Peace with Japan,32 and his Proclamation Termi-
nating the State of National Emergency in Respect to Japan.33
The Japanese Peace Treaty provided in Article I that the war
would end on the date when the Treaty came into force in
accordance with Article 23. Article 2334 of the Treaty pro-
vided that it should go into effect when instruments of rati-
fication had been deposited by Japan and by a majority, in-
cluding the United States of America as the Principal Occu-
pying Power, of the following states, namely Australia, Can-
ada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philip-
pines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America. This Treaty of
Peace, therefore, went into effect on April 28, 1952.
As Oppenheim points out,35 armistices or truces should not
be confused with peace. Armistices are merely a temporary
cessation of hostilities which may be resumed at any time.
Therefore, the conditions of war remain in effect between
the belligerents and between belligerents and neutrals on all
points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities.
The arrival of the Korean crisis involved the state courts
in additional questions as to whether war existed or not, and
therefore whether beneficiaries could collect double indemnity
benefits in the case of the death of the insured while he was
serving in the armed forces. In Western Reserve Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Meadows,36 the Supreme Court of Texas reversed
29. 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 186 (1946).
30. 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 13 (1952), Public Law 181, 82 Cong. 1st Ses-
sion,, 65 STAT. 451 (1951).
31. 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 71 (1952).
32. Id. at 96.
33. Id. at 97-98.
34. Id. at 82.
35. 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 25, at 433.
36. 152 Texas 559, 261 S. W. 2d 554 (1953).
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the Court of Civil Appeals of Fort Worth, Texas. The Su-
preme Court held that the strife in Korea was war within the
meaning of an insurance policy because it was war in fact
though undeclared by Congress.
The Court stated :37
But every forcible contest between two governments
de facto, or de jure, is war. War is an existing fact, and
not a legislative decree. Congress alone may have power
to declare it beforehand and thus cause or commence it.
But it may be initiated by other nations, or by traitors;
and then it exists, whether there is any declaration or
not.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari
on this case on March 15, 1954.38
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a similar insurance
case held that double indemnity for accidental death could be
collected because no war existed in Korea. In Be/ey v. Penn-
sylvania Mutual Life Insurance Company30 the Court pointed
out:
The existence or nonexistence of a 'state of war' is a
political, not a judicial question, and it is only if and
when a formal declaration of war has been made by the
political department of the Government that judicial
cognizance may be taken thereof, and that such determi-
nation becomes binding upon the judiciary. Insured's
beneficiary had the right to collect life insurance because
there was no war in Korea. It was a United Nations
'police action'.
In pointing out that military struggles are not necessarily
war, the Pennsylvania Court stated :40
It has been pointed out in a report of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that
during the period between 1798 and 1945 there were
some 150 or more occasions on which our military forces
were engaged in various countries, notably in China, Mex-
ico, Central American and Caribbean Republics, in the
course of some of which incidents there were really seri-
ous engagements and many casualties.
37. Id. at 557.
38. 347 U. S. 928 (1954).
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The Court give a similar decision in Harding v. Pennsyl-
vania Mutual Life Insurance Co.
4 1
In discussing the question as to whether war existed in
Korea, it is not enough to describe casualties, battles and
bloodshed to make it war according to international law.
Contention by armed forces may be simply reprisals as in the
naval strife between the United States and France, 1791-
1800.42 It may be insurgency as in the civil strife in Spain.
43
It may be aggression as the Japanese in Manchuria and in
China prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor 44 or Italy in Ethi-
opia.45 The intent of the parties is very important.46 In case
of aggression, third states are obligated to come to the as-
sistance of the victim of the aggression rather than remain
neutral as in case of war.
47
The intent of the United States is quite clear. There was
no declaration of war by Congress. President Truman soon
after the attack on South Korea stated that the United States
was "not at war". He called United States combat operations
in Korea as police action for the United Nations.48 Mr. Tru-
man later in 1952 still characterized the Korean fighting as
"police action". 49 In his National Emergency Proclamation,
issued December 16, 1950, President Truman declared the
Communists were aggressors but made no mention of war.50
It seems clear that the intent of Congress and the President
was that the action in Korea was not war but international
police action against communist aggression. It is suggested
that if life insurance companies desire to protect themselves
from such risks as Korea that they incorporate aggression,
41. 373 Pa. 270, 95 A. 2d 221 (1953).
42. See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886); Perrin v.
United States, 4 Ct. C1. 543 (1868), involving the bombing and burning
of Greytown, Nicaragua by Commander Hollins of the U. S. N.; and for
reprisals in general, see Hindmarsh, FORCE IN PEACE (1933).
43. Norman J. Padelford, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLO1M.ACY IN
THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIFE (1939). For further discussions of in-
surgency, see G. G. Wilson, Insurgency and International Maritime Law,
1 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1907); G. G. Wilson, Lectures on Insurgency, U. S.
Naval War College (1900).
44. Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain,
34 AM. J. INT'L L. 680-689 (1940), and see Draft Convention on Rights





48. N. Y. Times, June 30, 1950, p. 1.
49. FACTS-ON-FILE, p. 379 (1952).
50. 64 STAT. 454 (1950).
1958]
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insurgency and reprisals in the war clause.
A question that at times comes before state courts but more
often before federal courts is the question of a conflict be-
tween a state law and a treaty. Article VI, See. 2 of the United
States Constitution provides that the Constitution, the Laws
of the United States and all Treaties made under the authority
of the United States shall be the supreme law of the Land;
and every judge in every state is to be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.
The first state law to be invalidated by the Supreme Court
was not the Maryland law in MeCullock v. Maryland-51 but a
Virginia law which was contrary to a treaty in Ware v. Hyl-
ton52 just seven years after the adoption of the Constitution.
A debt due before the war by an American to a British subject
was during the Revolutionary War paid into the loan office of
the State of Virginia in accordance with a state law of De-
cember 20, 1777. The law provided that such payment dis-
charged the debt. The Supreme Court held that the Virginia
law was invalid as being in conflict with the fourth article
of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United
States of September 3, 1783. The debt was revived and a right
of recovery given to the creditor against the debtor in spite
of the prior payment to the state loan office of the State of
Virginia. In this case the defendant who was the debtor was
represented by John Marshall, later known for his national-
istic interpretation of the Constitution, who argued that the
Virginia statute was valid against the Treaty.
In Hopkirk v. Bell,53 the Supreme Court held that this same
treaty provision prevented the operation of a Virginia statute
of limitation to bar collection of antecedent debts. The Court
held in a number of cases that treaty provisions invalidate
inconsistent state laws governing the right of aliens to inherit
real estate. A Treaty with France was held to supersede con-
flicting laws in Chirac v. Chirac54 and Carneat v. Banks.55
The British Treaty of 1794 was upheld in Hughes v. Ed-
wards."0 John C. Calhoun in discussing the treaty power said:
51. 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
52. 3 U. S. (3 Dali.) 199 (1796).
53. 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806).
54. 15 U. S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
55. 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
56. 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824).
[Vol. I0
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Within these limits all questions which may arise be-
tween us and foreign powers, be the subject matter what
it may, fall within the treaty making power and may
be adjusted by it.
57
In case of a conflict between a treaty and a statute passed
by Congress the one of later date prevails and will be en-
forced by the courts. 8 In the case of state statutes, the treaty
takes precedence regardless of whether it is antecedent or
subsequent to the statute.5 9 In Sei Fujii v. State,60 the Cali-
fornia courts were confronted with the question as to the
validity of the California alien land laws in respect to the
United Nations Charter. The California alien land law prohib-
ited aliens who were ineligible for citizenship from owning
land in California unless they were granted such rights by
treaty. Sei Fujii brought action against the State of California
to determine whether an escheat had occurred under provi-
sions of the alien land law as to realty acquired by plaintiff in
July, 1948. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ad-
judged that the property had escheated to the State on the
date of the deed and the plaintiff appealed. The District
Court of Appeal, Emmet H. Wilson, Justice, held that the
provisions of the Alien Land Law were inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations.61 Justice Wilson stated:62
The Charter has become the 'supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding'. U. S. Constitution, Article
VI, sec. 2 ....
Among the Purposes and Principles found in Article I
of Chapter I are 'To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights.
To achieve international cooperation in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.' In Article II it is affirmed
57. John C. Calhoun, "A Discourse on the Constitution and Govern-
ment of the U. S.," The Works of Calhoun, Richard K. Crulle, ed., Co-
lumbia, S. C. (1851), vol. 1, 204.
58. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190 (1888).
59. Hackworth, Digest .... vol. 5, 185-186; Memorandum of Secre-
tary of State Hughes, Oct. 8, 1921, 324-326; Hyde II, 1463 ff.
60. 217 P. 2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950), rehearing denied, 218 P. 2d 595
(Cal. App. 1950), reversed, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
61. 217 P. 2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950).
62. Id. at 486.
1958] 199
11
McConaughy: International Law as Practiced in State Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
that the organization and its members 'shall fulfill in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter'.
It is agreed in Chapter IX, Article 55 that 'The United
Nations shall promote universal respect for and observ-
ance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion'.6 3
The State of California petitioned for a rehearing in the
District Court but the Court affirmed its previous decision
invalidating the California law 4 and stated that the fact that
Japan was not a member of the United Nations did not render
its nationals ineligible to the guarantees extended to all per-
sons without exception. 5
The State appealed this decision to the California Supreme
Court which rendered its opinion on April 17, 1952.66 Chief
Justice Gibson, although admitting that the United Nations
Charter was a treaty, pointed out that the parts of the Charter
claimed to be inconsistent with the California Alien Law,
namely, the Preamble and Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the Charter,
were not self-executing. Chief Justice Marshall was quoted
in Foster v. Neilson61 to the effect that a treaty could only
supersede a statute when it was self-executing without the
aid of any legislative provision. In the case of a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty, such treaty does not have the force of law until
the legislature has executed the contract and fulfilled the
treaty.6 9 The California Alien Law was, however, held un-
constitutional as being contrary to the equal protection and
due process of law clauses of the 14th Amendment.
In addition to treaties, executive agreements at times are
contrary to state laws. When the United States recognized the
Soviet Union, Litvinov entered into an executive agreement
with President Roosevelt wherein he assigned certain Rus-
sian assets in the United States to the United States Govern-
ment. In U. S. v. Belmont,"9 decided in 1937, the issue was
whether a federal district court could dismiss an action
brought by the United States, as assignee of certain monies
which were once the property of a Russian metal corporation
63. Id. at 487.
64. 218 P. 2d 595 (Cal. App. 1950).
65. Id. at 596.
66. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
67. 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
68. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 619-20 (1952).
69. 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
[Vol. 10
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whose assets had been appropriated by the Soviet Govern-
ment. The Supreme Court in an opinion written by Justice
Sutherland held that the executive agreement was an interna-
tional compact which, although entered into without the con-
sent of the Senate, was equally as binding upon federal courts
and state courts notwithstanding contrary state laws or poli-
cies as a treaty would be since the complete power over inter-
national affairs is in the national government and cannot be
subject to any curtailment on the part of the several states,
citing The Federalist No. 64. The Court held that the lower
court could not, therefore, dismiss the claim of the United
States for the Russian assets.
Another case involving the Litvinov Assignment came be-
fore the New York courts in Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v.
Bank of New York and Trust Company.70 In April, 1939, the
New York Court of Appeals refused extraterritorial effect
to the Soviet confiscatory decrees upon which the alleged title
of the United States was based. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and on February 12, 1940, affirmed
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals by an equally
divided court.7 1 Justices Stone, Reed and Murphy took no part
in the decision.
In United States v. Pink72 the United States instituted suit
in the Supreme Court of New York to recover the assets of
the First Russian Insurance Co., which had deposited certain
assets with the New York Superintendent of Insurance. The
defendant maintained, among other things, that if the Russian
decrees were to be given extraterritorial effect within the
State of New York, they would be confiscatory and therefore
contrary to public policy of the State of New York and un-
constitutional. On May 17, 1940, the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York dismissed the suit of the
United States without opinion on the basis of the Moscow
case decision by the U. S. Supreme Court. On December
31, 1940, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
missal and summary judgment.7" The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.7 4 The Court held that the executive
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union
70. 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. 2d 758 (1939).
71. 309 U. S. 624 (1940).
72. 259 App. Div. 871, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 665 (1940).
73. 284 N. Y. 555, 32 N. E. 2d 552 (1940).
74. 313 U. S. 553 (1941).
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was binding upon the State of New York regardless of its
policy or disapproval. No state could rewrite our foreign
policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Such an execu-
tive agreement need not be exercised so as to conform to state
laws, constitutions or judicial decrees.1 5 Justice Douglas made
it clear in his opinion in this case that in the field of foreign
affairs which includes executive agreements, the will of the
National Government is not only supreme but exclusive.
One of the questions which frequently comes before state
courts involving international law is the right of an alien to
inherit, purchase, hold and convey real estate. In Tucker v.
Atlantic Coast Lumber Co.7 6 the South Carolina Court held
that an assignee of an alien, such assignee being a citizen of
South Carolina, could enforce in the courts of South Carolina
the specific performance of a contract to convey more than
500 acres of land although aliens were forbidden to hold more
than 500 acres of land by South Carolina statute. Justice
Hydrick in discussing the rights of aliens to hold real estate
in South Carolina stated :77
At the common law an alien's title was good against the
world until 'office found'. The State has the exclusive
right to question the alien's birth, and right to the pos-
session of the land to which he had acquired title. I
know of no instance in the history of judicial proceedings
in this State, where a direct proceeding was instituted
on the part of the State to escheat the lands of an alien
owner in possession. It was only when an alien had to
appeal to the law to acquire title or get possession that
he was denied the aid of the courts. That doctrine rests
upon the principle, that the law will not with one hand
invest him with property and with the other divest him
of it. Nil frusta agit lex. Hence the rule that an alien
can acquire title to, and possession of, real property in
any mode by which a citizen can, except by act and opera-
tion of the law. While he cannot go into court and invoke
the aid of the law to get title or possession, he can, if
brought into court, defend them against all claimants ex-
cept the State.1 8
It is believed that the above is a good statement of the gen-
75. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
76. 78 S. C. 134, 59 S. E. 859 (1906).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss2/1
1958] INTERNATIONAL LAW IN STATE COURTS 203
eral practice in most states. Although the State could bring
action to escheat property to the State, such action is never
or only very rarely undertaken, but if the alien tries to en-
force title at law, the court will in many cases refuse to
grant it. In Joseph Groves v. Robert Gordon,7 9 Justice Col-
cock held that an alien who held real estate by purchase con-
trary to South Carolina law could convey the property be-
cause he could only be divested of title by office found and
no action had been brought by the State. The Court said,
however, that an alien could not inherit under the laws of the
State.
In Laurens v. Jenney,80 the South Carolina Court held that
an alien could hold by purchase any real estate except against
the State but that if he were out of possession, he could main-
tain no action to recover it. In Meeks v. Riehbourgh,s' the
Court declared that a grant of land made to an alien by the
State was void because of his alienage and because he had not
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States
as the statute of 1807 provided. In Ennas v. Franklin,2 the
South Carolina Court held that an alien could not inherit at
law real estate from an American citizen, and that the Treaty
between the United States and Great Britain of 1794, Article
9, did not apply because grantee was not a British citizen.
The state statutes in respect to the rights of aliens to in-
herit, purchase, hold, and devise real estate differ greatly.
Some states seem to give aliens equal rights with citizens.
The New York Code specifies that aliens have the same right
to take, hold, transmit and dispose of real estate as native
born citizens. 83 Alabama 4 and North Carolina 5 have similar
79. 3 Brev. 245 (S. C. 1812).
80. 1 Speers 356 (S. C. 1843).
81. 1 Mill 411 (S. C. 1817).
82. 2 Brev. 398 (S. C. 1810).
83. The listing of the state laws which follow is not inclusive but
only lists certain states as examples. NEW YoRx CODE ANN. (1945),
Real Property Law § 10-2, "Aliens are empowered to take, hold, trans-
mit, and dispose of real property within this state in the same manner as
native-born citizens and their heirs and devisees take in the same man-
ner as citizens."
84. ALABAMA CODE, 1940 § 47-1: "An alien, resident or non-resident,
may take, and hold, property, real and personal in this state, either by
purchase, descent, or devise, and may dispose of, and transmit the same
by sale, descent, or devise, as a native citizen."
85. GENERAL STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA (1950), Chap. 64: "It is
lawful for aliens to take both by purchase and descent or other operation
of law, any lands, tenements or hereditaments, and to hold and convey
the same as fully as citizens of this State, can or may do, any law or
usage to the contrary notwithstanding."
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provisions as that of New York. Virginia,80 Georgia,8 7 and
Maryland 8 grant the same rights to friendly aliens but not to
enemy aliens. Mississippi80 allows resident aliens the same
rights to land as citizens of the State but forbids non-resident
aliens from holding land. South Carolina law prohibits an
alien or a corporation controlled by aliens from owning or
controlling more than five hundred thousand acres of land
within the State.0 This was changed from five hundred to
five hundred thousand acres by Special Session of the South
Carolina Legislature on June 4-8, 1956. Illinois0 ' allows aliens
of the age of 21 or over to hold title to real estate for six
years after they acquire such property. The State's attorney
in Illinois is to bring suit to compel the sale of land and re-
turn the money from the sale to the State. 2 Arizona 93 allows
86. CODE OF VIRGINIA (1950) § 55-1: "Any alien, not an enemy, may
acquire by purchase or descent and hold real estate in this State; and
the same shall be transmitted in the same manner as real estate held by
citizens."
87. GEORGIA CODE ANN. (1935), § 79-303: "Aliens, the subjects of gov-
ernments at peace with the United States and this State, as long as their
governments remain at peace, shall be entitled to all the rights of citizens
of other States resident in this state, and shall have the privilege of
purchasing, holding and conveying real estate in this State."
88. 1 MARYLAND 280, CODE OF 1939: "Aliens, not enemies, may take
and hold lands, tenements and hereditaments acquired by purchase, or
to which they would, if citizens, be entitled by descent; and may sell,
devise or dispose of the same, or transmit the same to their heirs, as
fully and effectually and in the same manner, as if by birth, they were
citizens of this state."
89. MISSISSIPPI CODE, 1942, Section 842: "Resident aliens may acquire
and hold land, and may dispose of it and transmit it by descent, as citi-
zens of the state may; but non-resident aliens shall not hereafter ac-
quire or hold land."
90. Formerly, an alien or alien corporation could own or control no
more than five hundred acres. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952,
§ 57-103. This was changed in 1956 because of the desire of the Bo-
waters Paper Company, a British Corporation, to build a paper mill in
South Carolina. Cf. Acts and Joint Resolutions of South Carolina, 1956,
p. 2972, Law No. 1131, an Act to amend Section 57-103 CODE OF LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1952 as amended by Act No. 69 of the Acts of 1955,
relating to ownership of land by aliens.
91. ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES (1951) 6-1-8, Act of June 1, 1899:
"(1) All aliens may, subject to the further provisions of this act, acquire
and hold title in fee simple, or otherwise, to lands, tenements and heredi-
taments situate in this state, by deed, devise, or descent.... (2) If any
alien shall at the time of acquiring title to lands situate in this state be
of the age of 21 years or upwards, he may hold title to the same for six
years from and after the time of acquiring such title."
92. It is the author's understanding that this is never done in Illinois.
93. ARIzONA CODE OF 1939, 71-201: "All aliens eligible to citizenship
under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, trans-
mit and inherit real property, or any interest therein, the same as citizens
of the United States, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.
All other aliens may acquire, possess, enjoy and transfer real property
or any interest therein, only to the extent and for the purpose prescribed
16
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only aliens eligible for citizenship to hold or transfer real
estate unless they are allowed to do so by treaty with a for-
eign state. California had a similar law but it was held un-
constitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment. 94 Texas prohibits any alien or alien corporation
from owning any lands in the State with certain exceptions. 9
Other states which are quite restrictive in granting aliens
the right to hold and transmit real property are: Idaho,906
Indiana,97 North Dakota,98 and Oregon. 99
Some of the state statutes which restrict the rights of aliens
to take, hold and transmit real property do and will conflict
with treaties or agreements between the United States and
foreign countries. These treaties may be called Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Amity, Treaties of Peace, Status
of Aliens, Treaties Concerning Disposition of Real and Per-
sonal Property, and Consular Treaties. 10 0
by any treaty now existing between the United States and the nation
or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise."
Japanese held ineligible, Takiguchi v. State, 47 Ariz. 302.
94. See Sei Fujii v. State, supra, 242 P. 2d 617.
95. VERNONS' TEXAs STATUTES (1936), Article 166: "No alien or alien
corporation shall acquire any interest, right or title either legal or
equitable in or to any lands in the State of Texas, except as hereinafter
provided."
96. IDAHO CODE, 1932, Sections 23-101-23-112.
97. INDIANA BURNS' STATUTES (1933), para. 56-501-56-507.
98. N. DAKOTA CoMP. LAws (1929), para. 5256.
99. OREGON CODE (1930), para. 19-101-19-111.
100. The best source for these treaties is probably MALLOY'S TREATY
SERIES. Vols. 1 and 2, 1776-1909 (1910), 2 vols. 61st Cong. 2nd Sess., S.
Doc. 351, Serial Nos. 5646-5647. Vol. 3, 1910-1923, Compiled by C. F.
Redmond, (1923), 67th Cong. 4th Sess., Sen. Doc. 348, Serial No. 8167.
Vol. 4, 1923-1937, Compiled by E. J. Trenwith, (1938), 75th Cong. 2nd
Sess., S. Doc. 134, Serial No. 10239. It is to be hoped that the State
Dept. will soon publish a fifth volume to bring this collection up to date.
Another collection is TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, edited by Hunter Miller and published by the Govern-
ment Printing Office. This series while being very scholarly and having
texts in other languages as well as English is far behind the Malloy
Series chronologically. Until 1950, the treaties of the United States
were published in STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED STATES in the
same year that they were promulgated by the President. Since 1950,
the treaties are no longer published in the Statutes but are published
separately by the Dept. of State in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES. Volume 1 of this Series was published
in 1953 and was about three years behind the Statutes which makes it
inconvenient. See 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 242 (1953). For current infor-
mation, the Dept. of State issues the treaties separately in its TREATY
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES. These are separately num-
bered. The texts of these treaties may also be found in the League of
Nations Treaty Series during this organization's existence and since the
founding of the United Nations in the United Nations Treaty Series.
From time to time the State Dept. publishes a list of treaties in force.
The last one was TREATIES IN FORCE - A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
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INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON DECEIBER 31,
1941. It would be well for the State Dept. to bring this up to date with a
new edition.
An admittedly incomplete but it is hoped useful list of treaties af-
fecting the rights of aliens by countries would be as follows:
Albania: Agreement Relating to Most-Favored-Nation Treat-
ment and Other Matters. Signed at Tirana, June 23
and 25, 1922. Not Printed.
Argentina: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
Signed at San Jose, July 27, 1853. 10 STAT. (Pt. 2),
16. T. S. 4. I Treaties (Malloy) 20. Miller, Treaties,
VI, 269.
Australia: Supplementary Convention Amending Article IV and
second paragraph of Article VI of the Convention
Concerning the Tenure and Disposition of Real and
Personal Property of March 2, 1899 between the
United States and Great Britain. Signed at Wash-
ington May 27, 1936. 55 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1101. T. S.
964.
Belgium: Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Signed at
Washington, March 8, 1875. 19 STAT. 628. T. S. 28.
I Malloy 90. Consular Convention. Signed at Wash-
ington, March 9, 1880. 21 STAT. 776. T. S. 29. I
Treaties (Malloy) 94.
Bolivia: Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation. Signed at La Paz May 13, 1858. 12 STAT.
1003; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 68. T. S. 32. I Treaties (Mal-
loy) 113. Miller, Treaties VII, 733.
Borneo: Convention of Amity, Commerce and Navigation.
Signed at Brunei, June 23, 1850. 10 STAT. 909. 18
STAT. (Pt. 2) 79. T. S. 33. I Treaties (Malloy) 130.
Brazil: Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation. Signed at Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 12, 1828. 8
STAT. 390; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 81. T. S. 34. 1 Treaties
(Malloy) 133. Miller, Treaties III, 451.
Canada: (Great Britain) Supplementary Convention Pro-
viding for the Accession of the Dominion of Canada
to the Convention of March 2, 1899, between the
United States and Great Britain Concerning Tenure
and Disposition of Real and Personal Property.
Signed at Washington, Oct. 21, 1921. 42 STAT. (Pt.
2) 2147. T. S. 663 (printed with T. S. 146). III
Treaties (Redmond) 2657. 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TREATY SERIES 426.
Chile: Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation,
and Additional and Explanatory Convention. Signed
at Santiago, May 16, 1832 and Sept. 1, 1833. 8 STAT.
434, 456. 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 104. T. S. 40. I Treaties
(Malloy) 171, 181. Miller, Treaties III, 671. This
treaty has been terminated for the most part.
China: Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce. Signed at
Wang Hija July 3, 1844. 8 STAT. 592; 18 STAT. (Pt.
2) 116. T. S. 45. I Treaties (Malloy) 196. Miller,
Treaties, IV, 559. Treaty of Peace, Amity and Com-
merce. Signed at Tientsin, June 18, 1858. 12 STAT.
1023. 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 129. T. S. 46. I Treaties
(Malloy) 211. Miller, Treaties, VII, 793. Additional
Articles to the Treaty between the United States
and China of June 18, 1858. 16 STAT. 739; 18 STAT.
(Pt. 2) 147. T. S. 48. I Treaties (Malloy) 234.
Supplemental Treaty Concerning Commercial Inter-
course and Judicial Procedure. Signed at Peking,
Nov. 17, 1880. 22 STAT. 828. T. S. 50. I Treaties
18
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(Malloy) 239. Treaty to Extend Further the Com-
mercial Relations. Signed at Shanghai, October 8,
1903. 33 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2208. T. S. 430. I Treaties
(Malloy) 261. Treaty of Friendship. Signed Nov.
29, 1948. T. I. A. S. 1871.
Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce.
Signed at Bogota, Dec. 12, 1846. 9 STAT. 881; 18
STAT. (Pt. 2) 550. T. S. 54. I Treaties (Malloy)
302. Miller Treaties, V, 115. Consular Convention.
Signed at Washington, May 4, 1850. 10 STAT. 900;
18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 560. T. S. 55. I Treaties (Malloy)
314. Miller, Treaties, V, 803.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
Signed at Washington, July 10, 1851. 10 STAT. 916.
18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 159. T. S. 62. I Treaties (Malloy)
341. Miller, Treaties, V, 985.
Treaty of Relations. Signed at Washington, May 29,
1934. 48 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1682. T. S. 866. IV Treaties
(Trenwith) 4054. Consular Convention. Signed at
Habana, April 22, 1926. 44 STAT. (Pt. 3) 2471. T. S.
750. IV Treaties (Trenwith) 4048. 60 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS TREATY SERIES 371.
Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion. Signed at Washington, April 26, 1826. 8 STAT.
340. 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 167. T. S. 65. I Treaties
(Malloy) 373. Miller, Treaties, III, 239.
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Com-
merce. 8 STAT. 534; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 187. T. S. 76.
I Treaties (Malloy) 421. Miller, Treaties, IV, 207.
This treaty has been terminated for the most part.
Signed at Quito, June 13, 1839.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights. Signed at San Salvador, Feb. 22, 1926. 44
STAT. (Pt. 2) 2817. T. S. 827. IV Treaties (Tren-
with) 4615. 134 LEAGuE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIS
207.
Treaty of Commerce. Signed at Addis Ababa, June
27, 1914. 41 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1711. T. S. 647. III
Treaties (Redmond) 2578. Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce. Signed Sept. 7, 1951. Not printed yet.
30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 443 (1953).
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights, and Protocol. Signed at Washington, Feb.
13, 1934. 49 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2659. T. S. 868. IV
Treaties (Trenwith) 4138. 152 LEAGuE OF NATIONS
TREATY SERIES 45.
Convention of Navigation and Commerce. Signed at
Washington, June 24, 1822. 8 STAT. 278. 18 STAT.
(Pt. 2) 243. T. S. 87. I Treaties (Malloy) 521.
Miller, Treaties, III, 77. Agreement Modifying the
Provisions of Article VII of the Convention of Nav-
igation and Commerce of June 24, 1822. Signed at
Washington, July 17, 1919. 41 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1723.
T. S. 650. III Treaties (Redmond) 2594. Consular
Convention. Signed at Washington, February 23,
1853. 10 STAT. 992; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 249. T. S. 92.
I Treaties (Malloy) 528. Miller, Treaties, VI, 169.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights. Signed at Washington, Dec. 8, 1923. 44
STAT. (Pt. 3) 2132. T. S. 725. IV Treaties (Tren-
with) 4191. Agreement Terminating Parts of Arti-
cle VII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Consular Rights of December 8, 1923. Signed at
1958]
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Washington, June 3, 1935. 49 STAT. (Pt. 2) 3258.
T. S. 897. IV Treaties (Trenwith) 4221. 163 LEAGUE
OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 415. Treaty of Friend-
ship and Commerce. Signed June 3, 1953. Entered
into force Oct. 22, 1954. 31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 712
(1954). Not printed yet.
Convention to Regulate Commerce and Navigation.
Signed at London July 3, 1815. 8 STAT. 228. 18
STAT. (Pt. 2) 292. T. S. 110. I Treaties (Malloy)
624. Miller, Treaties, II, 595. Commercial Conven-
tion. Signed at London, August 6, 1827. 8 STAT.
361. 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 311. T. S. 117. I Treaties
(Malloy) 645. Miller, Treaties, III, 315. Convention
Concerning Tenure and Disposition of Real and Per-
sonal Property. Signed at Washington, March 2,
1899. 31 STAT. 1939. T. S. 146. I Treaties (Malloy)
774. Supplementary Convention Relative to Tenure
and Disposition of Real and Personal Property.
Signed at Washington, Jan. 13, 1902. 32 STAT. (Pt.
2) 1914. T. S. 402 (printed with 146). I Treaties
(Malloy) 776. Consular Convention. Signed June 6,
1951. T. I. A. S. 2494.
Consular Convention. Signed at Athens, Nov. 19/
Dec. 2, 1902. 33 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2122. T. S. 424. I
Treaties (Malloy) 855. Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce. Signed Aug. 3, 1951. In force Oct. 13,
1954. Not printed yet.
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation. Signed at Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849. 10 STAT.
873; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 378. I Treaties (Malloy) 861.
Miller, Treaties, V, 547. This treaty is terminated
for the most part. Convention Relative to Tenure
and Disposition of Real and Personal Property.
Signed at Guatemala City, Aug. 27, 1901. 32 STAT.
(Pt. 2) 1944. T. S. 412. I Treaties (Malloy) 876.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights. Signed at Tegucigalpa, Dec. 7, 1927. 45
STAT. (Pt. 2) 2618. T. S. 764. IV Treaties (Tren-
with) 4306. 87 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIEs
421.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, Consular Rights,
and Exchange of Notes. Signed at Washington,
June 24, 1925. 44 STAT. (Pt. 3) 2441. T. S. 748.
IV Treaties (Trenwith) 4318. 58 LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS TREATY SERIES 111.
Provisional Agreement Effected by Exchange of
Notes (Regarding Diplomatic. Consular, Tariff and
Other Relations). Signed at Teheran, May 14, 1928.
47 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2644. E. A. S. 19. 107 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS TREATY SERIEs 375.
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Signed at
Baghdad, Dec. 3, 1938. 54 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1790. T. S.
960.
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Signed Jan.
21, 1950. T. I. A. S. 2155.
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Signed Aug.
23, 1951. 30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 803 (1953). Not
printed yet.
Temporary Commercial Arrangement. Signed at
Rome, Dec. 16, 1937. 51 STAT. 361. E. A. S. 116. 187
LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIEs 15. Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce. Signed Feb. 2, 1948.
T. I. A. S. 1965. Consular Convention. Signed at
208 [Vol. 10
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Washington, May 8, 1878. 20 STAT. 725. T. S. 178.
I Treaties (Maloy) 977.
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Signed April
2, 1953. T. I. A. S. 2863.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
Signed at Monrovia, August 8, 1938. 54 STAT. (Pt.
2) 1739. T. S. 956. Consular Convention. Signed at
Monrovia, Oct. 7, 1938. 54 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1751. T. S.
957.
Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Signed at Mecca-
nez, Sept. 16, 1836. 8 STAT. 484; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2)
521. T. S. 244-2. I Treaties (Malloy) 1212. Miller,
Treaties, IV, 33.
Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Signed at Muscat,
Sept. 21, 1833. 8 STAT. 458; 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 528.
T. S. 247. I Treaties (Malloy) 1228. Miller, Treaties,
III, 789.
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Signed April
25, 1947. T. I. A. S. 1585.
Convention of Commerce and Navigation. Signed at
Washington, Aug. 26, 1852. 10 STAT. 982. 18 STAT.
(Pt. 2) 544. T. S. 252. I Treaties (Malloy) 1248.
Miller, Treaties, VI, 75. Consular Convention. Signed
at The Hague, Jan. 22, 1855. 10 STAT. 1150; 18 STAT.
(Pt. 2) 546. T. S. 253. II Treaties (Malloy) 1251.
Miller, Treaties, VII, 3.
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Concluded at
Stockholm, July 4, 1827. 8 STAT. 346; 18 STAT. (Pt.
2) 736. T. S. 348. II Treaties (Malloy) 1748. Mil-
ler, Treaties, III, 283. This treaty has been termi-
nated in part by succeeding treaty. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, and
Additional Article. Signed at Washington, June 5,
1928, and Feb. 25, 1929. 47 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2135.
T. S. 852. IV Treaties (Trenwith) 4527. 134
LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 81.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
Signed at Asuncion, Feb. 4, 1859. 12 STAT. 1091;
18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 594. T. S. 272. II Treaties (Mal-
loy) 1364.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights. Signed at Washington, June 15, 1931. 48
STAT. (Pt. 2) 1507. T. S. 862. IV Treaties (Tren-
with) 4572. 139 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES
395.
Consular Convention. Signed at Bucharest, June
5/17, 1881. 23 STAT. 711. T. S. 297. II Treaties
(Malloy) 1505.
Provisional Agreement in Regard to Diplomatic and
Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Com-
merce, and Navigation. Signed at London, Novem-
ber 7, 1933. 48 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1826. E. A. S. 53. 142
LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 329.
Treaty of Friendship and General Relations. 33
STAT. (Pt. 2) 2105. T. S. 422. II Treaties (Malloy)
1701.
Consular Convention. Signed at Washington, June
1, 1910. 37 STAT. (Pt. 2) 1479. T. S. 557. III
Treaties (Redmond) 2846.
Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and Extradi-
tion. Signed at Berne, Nov. 25, 1850. 11 STAT. 587;
18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 748. T. S. 353. II Treaties (Mal-
loy) 1763. Miller, Treaties, V, 845.
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The Convention as to Tenure and Disposition of Real Prop-
erty between the United Kingdom and the United States 0 1
concluded March 2, 1899, in Article 1 provided that in case
of the death of any person within the territories of one of the
Contracting Parties, when such person holds real property
which would pass to a citizen or subject of the other Contract-
ing Party, were he not disqualified by the laws of the country
where such property is situated, that such heir shall be al-
lowed three years to sell such property.10 2 Article V of the
same Treaty provides reciprocal most favored nation treat-
ment in the disposal of all kinds of property.
0 3
Thailand: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
Final Protocol, and Exchange of Notes. Signed at
Bangkok, Nov. 13, 1937. 53 STAT. (Pt. 3) 1731;
T. S. 940. 192 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES
247.
Tonga: Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation. Signed
at Nukualofa, Oct. 2, 1886. 25 STAT. 1440. T. S. 357.
II Treaties (Malloy) 1781. This treaty is largely
abrogated.
Turkey: Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Signed at
Ankara, Oct. 1, 1929. 46 STAT. (Pt. 2) 2743. T. S.
813. IV Treaties (Trenwith) 4667. 114 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS TREATY SERIES 499.
U. S. S. R.: Agreement Regulating the Position of Corporations
and Other Commercial Associations. Signed at St.
Petersburg, June 25/12, 1904. 36 STAT. (Pt. 2)
2163. T. S. 526. 11 Treaties (Malloy) 1534. Agree-
ment Regarding Commercial Relations and Related
Notes According Most-Favored-Nation Treatment.
Signed at Moscow, Aug. 4, 1937. 50 STAT. (Pt. 2)
1619. E. A. S. 105. 182 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY
SERIES 113. Agreement Continuing in Force Until
August 6, 1942 the Agreement of August 4, 1937
Regarding Commercial Relations. 55 STAT. (Pt. 2)
1316. E. A. S. 215.
Yemen: Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. Signed May
4, 1946. T. I. A. S. 1535.
Yugoslavia: Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Signed at
Belgrade, Oct. 2/14, 1881. 22 STAT. 963. T. S. 319.
II Treaties (Malloy) 1613. Consular Convention.
Signed at Belgrade, Oct. 2/14, 1881. 22 STAT. 968.
T. S. 320. II Treaties (Malloy) 1618.
Zanzibar: Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United
States and Muscat, 1833. 8 STAT. 458. 18 STAT. (Pt.
2) 528. T. S. 247. I Treaties (Malloy) 1228. Miller,
Treaties, III, 789.
101. 31 STAT. 1939, T. S. 146.
102. Article 1 "Where on the death of any person holding real prop-
erty (or property not personal), with in the territories of one of the
Contracting Parties, such real property would, by the laws of the land,
pass to a citizen or subject of the other, were he not disqualified by the
aws of the country where such real property is situated, such citizen
or subject shall be allowed a term of three years in which to sell the
same .... "
103. Article V "In all that concerns the right of disposing of every
kind of property, real or personal, citizens or subjects of each of the
[Vol. 10
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Article VII of the Consular Convention with France of
February 23, 1853104i provides that in the various States of
the Union, Frenchmen shall have the same rights of holding
personal and real property as citizens of the United States
where existing laws permit.'0 5 The President is to recommend
to the various States that they enact laws permitting aliens to
hold and enjoy real property.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
with Germany of December 8, 1923106 provides in Article I
that the nationals of each of the Contracting Parties shall
have the right to own and erect and occupy appropriate
buildings and to lease lands for residential, scientific, re-
ligious, philanthropic, manufacturing, commercial and mortu-
ary purposes upon the same terms as nationals of the State
of residence or as nationals of the nation hereafter to be
most favored. 0 7 In case of inheritance of real property by
nationals of one Contracting Party in the territory of the
other Contracting Party where the alien is unable to inherit
because of the laws of the country, the alien shall be allowed
a term of three years which may be reasonably prolonged in
order to sell such property and withdraw the proceeds. 08
High Contracting Parties shall in the Dominion of the other enjoy the
rights which are or may be accorded to citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation."
104. 10 STAT. 992, 18 STAT. (Pt. 2) 249, T. S. No. 92.
105. Article VII "In all the States of the Union, whose existing laws
permit it, so long and to the same extent as the said laws shall remain
in force, Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal and real
property by the same title and in the same manner as the citizens of the
United States ....
As to the States of the Union, by whose existing laws aliens are not
permitted to hold real estate, the President engages to recommend to
them the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of
conferring this right."
106. 44 STAT. 2132, T. S. No. 725 (1923). This treaty is now in effect
according to an Agreement signed at Bonn, Germany, on June 3, 1953.
28 DEP'T STATE BULL., 877-78 (1953).
107. Article 1 "The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties
shall be permitted to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the
other; to exercise liberty of conscience and freedom of worship; to
engage in professional, scientific, religious, philanthropic, manufactur-
ing and commercial work of every kind without interference; to carry
on every form of commercial activity which is not forbidden by local
law; to own, erect or lease and occupy appropriate buildings, and to
lease lands for residential, scientific and religious, philanthropic, manu-
facturing, commercial and mortuary purposes; to employ agents of their
choice, and generally to do anything incidental to or necessary for the
enjoyment of any of the foregoing privileges upon the same terms as
nationals of the state of residence or as nationals of the nation here-
after to be most favored by it, submitting themselves to all local laws
and regulations duly established."
108. Article IV "Where, on the death of any person holding real or
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The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Japan of 1953, provides that nationals of each Contracting
Party shall be accorded within the territories of the other
Contracting Party'09 national treatment with respect to leas-
ing land, buildings, and other immoveable property and other
rights in immoveable property permitted by the applicable
laws of the other Party."0 Nationals of each Party are to
be permitted to inherit freely all types of property, and if
laws probihit them from receiving national treatment because
of alienage, such nationals are to be permitted at least five
years to dispose of such property."' Most of the other
treaties in respect to the rights of aliens to own or inherit
real property are similar. The new Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Israel of August 23, 1951,112
however, has a new approach in that Americans have only
such rights in respect to real property in Israel as their States
allow nationals of Israel. 113
other immoveable property or interests therein within the territories of
one High Contracting Party, such property or interest therein, would,
by the laws of the country or by a testamentary disposition, descend or
pass to a national of the other High Contracting Party, whether resi-
dent or non-resident, were he not disqualified by the laws of the country
where such property or interests therein is or are situated, such na-
tional shall be allowed a term of three years in which to sell the
same.... "
109. T. I. A. S. 2863. Article IX "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be accorded within the territories of the other Party: (a)
National treatment with respect to leasing land, buildings and other
immoveable property appropriate to the conduct of activities in which
they are permitted to engage pursuant to Articles VII and VIII and
for residential purposes and with respect to occupying and using such
property; and (b) Other rights in immoveable property permitted by
the applicable laws of the other Party."
110. Ibid.
111. (3) "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted
freely to dispose of property within the territories of the other Party
with respect to the acquisition of which through testate or intestate
succession their alienage has prevented them from receiving national
treatment, and they shall be permitted a term of at least five years in
which to effect such disposition."
112. The text of this treaty may be found in 83rd Cong. 1st Sess.,
Part 7, pp. 9317-8321. Consented to by the U. S. Senate July 21, 1953.
113. Article IX (b) "Other rights in immoveable property permitted
by the applicable laws of the States, Territories, ind possessions of the
United States of America. (2) Nationals and companies of the United
States of America shall be accorded, within the territories of Israel,
national treatment with respect to acquiring by purchase, or otherwise,
and with respect to owning, occupying and using land, buildings and
other immoveable property. However, in the case of any such national
domiciled in, or any such company constituted under the laws of any
State, Territory or Possession of the United States of America that ac-
cords less than national treatment to nationals and companies of Israel
in this respect, Israel shall not be obligated to accord treatment more
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The case of Sei Fujii v. State involving the validity of
the California Alien Land Law in respect to the United
Nations Charter has already been discussed." 4 Although
the Supreme Court of California ultimately decided that
the California alien land law was invalid as being con-
trary to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment,
yet the question of the conflict between the state statute
and a treaty had been raised and the state statute had been
held invalid in the lower courts as being contrary to the
United Nations Charter." 5 In Canada in a similar case, the
Canadian court declared invalid a restrictive covenant" 6
annexed to land which provided that land was "not to be
sold to Jews or to persons of objectionable nationality" on
the grounds that such a covenant was contrary to public
policy. The court cited the United Nations Charter to show
that the restrictive covenant was contrary to the policy of
the Dominion Government since the Dominion Parliament had
ratified the Charter."'
In Dutton v. Donahue,"5 the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held that non-resident aliens in England could inherit and
dispose of real property under the Treaty with Great Brit-
ain" 9 although under Wyoming law the real property would
have escheated to the State in the absence of the treaty. In
Goos v. Brocks, 20 the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided
that Article 14 of the Treaty with Prussia concluded May 1,
1828 (8 Stat. 384) and Article 7 of the Treaty with Hamburg
concluded December 20, 1827 (8 Stat. 370) conferred the
right on German non-resident aliens to inherit real estate
even though contrary to Nebraska law and even though the
United States and Germany were at war when the deceased
died intestate. Justice Good, writing the opinion for the
Court, held that the war did not abrogate these treaties.
In California a similar case occurred. In In re Knutzen's
Estate,12 Alfred Carl Knutzen, a resident of San Joaquin
County, California, died intestate. He left surviving him one
favorable in this respect than such State, Territory or possession accords
to nationals and companies of Israel."
114. Cf. supra, notes 61, 64, 66.
115. Ibid.
116. Re Drummond Wren, [19451 4 D. L. R. 674 (Canada).
117. Id. at 677.
118. 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. 2d 90 (1932).
119. 31 STAT. 1939.
120. 117 Neb. 750, 223 N. W. 13 (1929).
121. 161 P. 2d 598 (Cal. App. 1945).
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brother, Theodore J. Knutzen, living in Gatos, California, and
one brother and two sisters living in Sylt, Schlesswig-Hol-
stein, Germany. The German heirs sought to inherit under
the terms of Article IV of the Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Consular Rights between the United States and
Germany. (44 Stat. 2132.) The Probate Code of California,
Section 259 provided that non-resident aliens could only in-
herit if the country of their nationality allowed American citi-
zens a reciprocal right. The California court held that the
Treaty made state law paramount in the matter of descent
and that since the German heirs had failed to prove reci-
procity by Germany that the German heirs could not inherit.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, 12 2 Chief Jus-
tice Gibson reversed the decision of the District Court of
Appeal and held that the German heirs could inherit without
proving German reciprocity since the Treaty of 1925 took
precedence over the California law which was in conflict
with the treaty.
The most-favored-nation clause in treaties dealing with the
right of aliens to hold, own, occupy and inherit real estate in-
creases the complications involved in cases of this kind. It
may be that even though the treaty does not confer the right
to an alien to hold or inherit real estate contrary to the law
of the State, that nevertheless the alien may do so, not under
the treaty between the United States and the state of which
he is a national but under another treaty between the United
States and another state of which he is not a national. He
may take advantage of this second treaty because of a most-
favored-nation clause in the treaty between the United States
and the state of which he is a national.
In Rizzotto v. Grima,'123 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
decided that in the case of a citizen of Italy who died intestate
in Louisiana leaving real property which was sold to pay
creditors, that because of Article 22 of the Treaty of 1871
between the United States and Italy which contained a most-
favored-nation clause that the Treaty of 1899 between the
United States and Great Britain should have been applied
and the Italian consul notified. Since the heirs suffered no
disadvantage, the title was not disturbed.
Another instance in which international law questions may
122. 31 Cal. 2d 573, 191 P. 2d 747 (1948).
123. 164 La. 1, 113 So. 658 (1927).
214 [Vol. 10
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come up in state courts is the licensing of professions by the
states. According to Senator Hickenlooper about half of the
states in the United States have neither a constitutional nor
a statutory limitation against aliens practicing professions if
they meet the other qualifications.124 About half of the
states, however, have such limitations. Most of the states.
which have limitations limit the rights of aliens to practice
law and medicine. Illinois, for instance, provides that an
applicant for the medical examination must either be a citizen
of the United States or have made a declaration of intention
to become a citizen of the United States.12 5 If he has made a
declaration, he must have filed a petition of naturalization
within 30 days after becoming eligible to do so.126
Some of the later treaties of friendship specify that alien-
age shall not be a bar to the practice of the professions. The
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of January
21, 1950 with Ireland 27 provides in Article 6 that the na-
tionals and companies of either Party are to be accorded,
within the territories of the other national treatment with
respect to the practice of professional activities with the ex-
ception of the practice of law. 28 The Treaty of 1953 with
Japan 29 provided that if otherwise qualified Japanese na-
tionals could practice the professions on the same basis as
United States nationals. 30 Similar provisions were incorpo-
rated in treaties signed with Colombia, April 26, 1951; Israel,
August 23, 1951; Ethiopia, September 7, 1951; Italy, Septem-
ber 26, 1951; Denmark, October 11, 1951 and Greece, August
3, 1951.131 Public hearings were held on these treaties on
May 9, 1952 but the Subcommittee did not report them out
124. CONG. REC., 83 Cong., 1st Sess., Part 7, p. 9314.
125. ILLINOIS REV. STAT., 1951 § 91-4. Medical Practice Act of June
30, 1923.
126. Id., (d).
127. T. I. A. S. 2155, Article VI.
128. (1) "Nationals and companies of either party shall be accorded,
within the territories of the other Party, national treatment with re-
spect to: (a) engaging in commercial, manufacturing, processing and
financial activities, subject to paragraph 4 of the present article, and in
publishing, scientific, educational, religious, philanthropic and profes-
sional activities, except the practice of law."
129. T. I. A. S. 2863.
130. Article VIII (2) "Nationals of either Party shall not be barred
from practicing their professions within the territories of the other
Party merely by reason of their alienage; but they shall be permitted
to engage in professional activities therein upon compliance with the
requirements regarding qualifications, residence and competence that
are applicable to nationals of such other Party."
131. 27 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 588 (1952).
1958] 216,
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immediately because of opposition to the national treatment
of aliens engaged in professions. 1 32 The Treaty with Colom-
bia was returned to the President as requested by him in his
message of June 22, 1953.133 The United States Senate made
reservations to the Japanese, Israeli, and Danish treaties
which provided that national treatment should not extend to
professions which involved the performance of functions in a
public capacity or in the interest of public health and safety
and were reserved by statute or constitution exclusively to
citizens of the United States.13 4  The most-favored-nation
clause was not to apply to such professions. The denial of the
most-favored-nation clause was evidently necessary in this
respect because the Treaty with Ireland had accorded national
treatment to all citizens of Ireland in practicing their profes-
sions in the United States with the exception of law. There-
fore, other aliens whose states had most-favored-nation
treaties with the United States in respect to professions could
have taken advantage of the Irish Treaty and practiced medi-
cine and related professions if properly qualified without dis-
crimination because of their alienage.
The validity of divorces granted by foreign states often
comes before state courts. One of the most important consid-
erations involved in the validity of such divorces is the juris-
diction of the foreign courts. In Bethune v. Bethune,13 5 the
Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to recognize the validity
of a Mexican divorce on the grounds that the Mexican court
lacked jurisdiction since the husband resided in Mexico only
nine days and appeared in court only once without giving any
testimony. The Supreme Court of California refused to rec-
ognize another Mexican divorce in Ryder v. Ryder 136 because
neither the husband or wife had resided in Mexico during the
year when the divorce was granted. In Ferrett v. Ferrett's7
the New Mexican court held that a Mexican divorce was valid
132. Ibid.
133. CONG. REC., 83 Cong., 1st Sess., Part 6, p. 7675.
134. Id. Part 7, p. 9321 and 9329. For instance, in the Japanese
Treaty, Article VIII (2). "Article VIII, paragraph 2, shall not extend
to professions which, because they involve the performance of functions
in a public capacity or in the interest of public health and safety, are
state licensed and reserved by statute or constitution exclusively to citi-
zens of the country, and no most-favored-nation clause in the said treaty
shall apply to such professions."
135. 192 Ark. 811, 94 S. W. 2d 1043 (1936).
136. 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P. 2d 1069 (1935).
137. 55 N. M. 565, 327 P. 2d 594 (1951).
216 [Vol. 10
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unless it could be shown that the Mexican court did not have
jurisdiction because of lack of domicile.
A Cuban divorce decree was upheld by the New York
Court 1 38 so far as the divorce was concerned but was held
invalid as to custody of a child who was not within the Cuban
court's jurisdiction.
In Newman v. Newman'39 the New York Supreme Court
refused to issue a temporary injunction to restrain a husband
from obtaining a Mexican mail order divorce because such a
divorce would be invalid in New York since the Mexican
court lacked jurisdiction. Justice Hallinan in the above case
pointed out that Mexican mail order divorces had been uni-
formly held invalid because the jurisdiction of the Mexican
courts was lacking. 140 He also pointed out that foreign di-
vorces were recognized in the United States by state courts
merely as a matter of comity.'-' Justice Desdmond in In Re
Rathscheck's Estate4 2 held, however, that a wife who ob-
tained an invalid Mexican mail order divorce by collusion with
her husband was prevented by New York statute from inherit-
ing her share of the estate if her husband died intestate. In his
dissenting opinion 43 Justice Conway differed from the ma-
jority opinion because he believed that the New York statute
applied to other states of the United States and not to foreign
countries.
In Ruderman v. Ruderman44 the court held a Mexican di-
vorce invalid even though both parties were married and lived
there together for short periods of time because matrimonial
domicile was never established there. In another decision, a
little more than a year later, the same court in Oettgen v.
Oettgen,145 held that lack of domicile in a foreign country was
not necessarily a bar to recognition of a divorce granted in
such foreign country by the courts of New York where the
parties were German aliens, were married there, and were
138. Quintana v. Quintana, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 593 (1950).
139. 44 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (1943).
140. Citing Matter of Alsmann v. Maher, 231 App. Div. 139, 246
N. Y. S. 60; Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819; May v.
May, 251 App. Div. 63, 295 N. Y. S. 599; Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779, 21
N. E. 2d 616.
141. 44 N. Y. S. 2d 525 (1943).
142. 300 N. Y. 346, 90 N. E. 2d 887 (1950).
143. Id. at 891.
144. 82 N. Y. S. 2d 479 (1948).
145. 94 N. Y. S. 2d 168 (1949).
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represented by counsel there. In Gould v. Gould146 the Court
of Appeals of New York held that a divorce granted by the
Civil Tribunal of Versailles, Department of Seine-et-Oise, Re-
public of France, was valid. The divorce was granted there
on the ground of the adultery of the wife. Both parties were
American citizens, and at the time of the divorce the legal
domicile of the parties was in New York. The Court held
that the parties were within the jurisdiction of the French
Court and that the decision of the French court was in ac-
cordance with public policy in New York. It would seem from
the above decision that a divorce in a foreign country could
be impeached on the ground that it was contrary to the public
policy of the State within which recognition was sought. This
might mean that if certain grounds for divorce were valid
in a foreign country but were not valid in the State in which
recognition was sought that recognition might not be granted
because the grounds were contrary to public policy of the
recognizing state.
In addition to divorce judgments of foreign countries, there
are at times the question of the recognition by the state courts
of other foreign judgments. Although the United States Su-
preme Court in Hilton v. Guyot147 held that a judgment of
the Tribunal of Commerce, a French court having jurisdiction
over suits between merchants, should be tried de novo in the
courts of the United States because France did not grant re-
ciprocal recognition to the decrees of American courts, the
New York Court of Appeals in Johnston v. Compagnie Gen-
erale Transatlantique148 held that an adjudication of the
Tribunal of Commerce at Paris was conclusive unless im-
peached for fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The court refused
to base its decision upon reciprocity and stressed in its opinion
the merit of the decision itself.
A state is under no obligation to recognize the judgments of
an unrecognized foreign government. Since the foreign gov-
ernment has not been recognized de facto or de jure by the
United States Government, it is as though the foreign gov-
ernment does not exist. In Sokoloff v. National City Bank,4 9
the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a decree
of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic national-
146. 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).
147. 159 U. S. 113 (1895).
148. 242 N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121 (1926).
149. 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924).
[Vol. 10
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izing all private banks within the Soviet Union. The plaintiff
in this case had paid the National City Bank a sum of money
which was to be deposited in rubles in the Petrograd branch
of the bank. After the nationalization, the bank refused to
pay the plaintiff any further either in dollars or rubles. The
court held that the National City Bank had no right to refuse
to honor drafts because the acts of the Soviet Government
were not recognized in the United States since the Soviet
Government was an unrecognized government and the Na-
tional City Bank operated under American law.
A foreign government recognized de facto is in general en-
titled to the recognition of its decrees issued within its juris-
diction. In Salimoff and Co. v. Standard Oil of New York, 150
the New York Court of Appeals upheld the Soviet Govern-
ment's decree nationalizing oil lands within its jurisdiction.
The former owners of the property, Russian nationals, sued in
the New York courts for an accounting, claiming that since
the Soviet Government was not recognized de jure by the
United States that the decree of nationalization should not be
recognized by the New York courts. The Court of Appeals
decided, however, that since at the time of the decision, the
Soviet Government had been recognized de facto, the national-
ization of the oil was legal according to Russian laws; and
the complaints of the plaintiffs were dismissed.
A foreign government recognized de jure by the United
States has also in general a right to have its decrees and judg-
ments recognized in the state courts. In Daugherty v. Equita-
ble Life Insurance Co.,151 the New York court upheld the de-
crees of the Russian Government nationalizing private in-
surance companies within the Soviet Union. The Equitable
Life Insurance Company was licensed to do business in Rus-
sia. The plaintiff demanded return of premiums with interest
in New York but the New York court refused on the grounds
that private insurance companies in Russia had been national-
ized. In United States v. Pink' 5 2 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the New York Court of Appealsr 3 and upheld
the validity of Soviet decrees nationalizing insurance com-
150. 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679, 89 A. L. R. 345 (1933). For an ex-
cellent discussion of this point see the English case Luther v. Sagor,
[1921] 3 K. B. 532 (C. A.).
151. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
152. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
153. 284 N. Y. 555, 32 N. E. 2d 552 (1940).
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panies, extending the effect of such decrees to funds held by
the New York Insurance Commissioner, even though the New
York Court had held such decrees as being invalid in New
York because contrary to the public policy of the state.
Cases sometimes arise in the state courts as to the right of
foreign sovereigns to sue and be sued in the state courts. In
general, recognized foreign sovereigns may sue in the state
courts. In Republic of Honduras v. Soto,'154 the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the right of Honduras to sue a pri-
vate individual for the recovery of certain monies which such
individual had allegedly converted to his own use. In King
of Prussia v. Kuepper's Adm'r,155 Justice Scott held that a
foreign government recognized by the U. S. may sue in the
state courts if it elects and that although the federal courts
have jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is concurrent and not ex-
clusive with the federal courts. The Sultan of Turkey in
Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian56 sued in the New York courts
to recover a legacy owed to a subject of Turkey. A foreign
state may sue in the state courts in order to demand an ac-
counting of funds allegedly illegally seized and in the posses-
sion of a former official of the government who is within
the jurisdiction of the state court.
57
Although a recognized sovereign may sue in the state courts
for redress, an unrecognized state may not sue because of a
lack of comity and because it would be contrary to public
policy. 38 When an unrecognized state lacks the capacity to
sue in state courts, the individual members of a subordinate
governmental body of that government have no better or
greater rights than the principal.'5 9
The general principle of international law is that a foreign
state cannot be sued without its consent. In French Republic
v. Board of Supervisors of Jefferson County, 00 the Board of
Supervisors had sought to collect taxes on certain tobaccos
owned by the tobacco monopoly of the French Government.
An action was brought to place a lien against the tobacco until
the taxes were paid. Justice Clay pointed out that the French
154. 112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889).
155. 22 Mo. 550 (1856).
156. 213 N. Y. 429, 108 N. E. 72 (1915).
157. State of Yucatan v. Argumedo, 157 N. Y. S. 219 (1915).
158. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario. 235 N.
Y. 255, 136 N. E. 259 (1923).
159. Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. S. 275 (1922).
160. 200 Ky. 18, 252 S. W. 124 (1923).
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Republic was not suable in the state courts without its consent
and that the tobacco itself could not be subjected to the tax.
If the assessment were upheld, there would be no way of
collecting the tax. The State of Kentucky has no power either
to negotiate or declare war. Kentucky might ask the State
Department to open international negotiations, or seek to per-
suade Congress to declare war for the purpose of collecting
the taxes. The State of Kentucky would thus be helpless in
seeking to collect a tax from a foreign sovereign. In a suit
by an individual against the Intercolonial Railroad of Can-
ada1 61 in the Supreme Court of Massachuestts, Chief Justice
Knowlton refused to allow suit for personal injury against
the railroad since it belonged to Edward VII, King of the
United Kingdom and of the Dominion of Canada. A foreign
sovereign could not be sued against his consent in a foreign
court. In a suit by an individual for compensation for legal
services against a Nicaraguan railroad, the Supreme Court
of Maine likewise dismissed the suit because the railroad
was owned by the Government of Nicaragua which was not
subject to suit without its consent.162
An unrecognized foreign government cannot be sued in the
state courts for an exercise of sovereignty within its own
territory. 16 3 The reasoning of the New York Court seemed
to be based on the fact that a de facto foreign government,
whether recognized or not, exists and has sovereign immunity.
In this case the plaintiff was bringing suit to recover furs
confiscated within the Soviet Union and not within the juris-
diction of the court. The lower New York court had allowed
suit against the unrecognized Russian government but was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. 164
A foreign government or mixed corporation may, however,
be sued in state or federal courts under certain conditions.
A sovereign state may be sued if it waives its sovereign im-
munity. In U. S. of Mexico v. Rask, 65 the District Court of
Appeal of California upheld a shipwright's lien for repair
161. Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E.
876 (1908).
162. Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251,
18 A. 2d 688 (1941).
163. Wolfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234
N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
164. 202 App. Div. 421, 195 N. Y. S. 472 (1922).
165. 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. 2d 981 (1931). See this opinion for a fine
review of sovereign immunity.
1958]
33
McConaughy: International Law as Practiced in State Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
of a Mexican patrol boat. Justice Marks in his opinion held
that the Mexican Government had waived its sovereign im-
munity by (1) bringing action to recover the patrol boat and
(2) because no representations of sovereign immunity were
made by Mexican diplomats or the United States Department
of State and that the attorney for the Mexican Government
had no authority to claim sovereign immunity for the Mexican
Government. If a foreign state brings suit, it waives its sov-
ereign immunity to a counter claim even if such counter claim
is not based on the subject matter of the foreign govern-
ment's suit.,'
Suit may be brought against a mixed corporation, i. e. a
corporation the stock of which is jointly owned by govern-
mental and private interests. In Molina v. Comision Regula-
dora del Mercado de Henequin 7 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that property could be attached even though part
of the interest in a sisal corporation was owned by the State
of Yucatan. The theory of this case would seem to be that in
case of a mixed corporation organized for profit, that the
private ends overcome the public ends and that the foreign
state has waived its immunity. It is to be hoped that in the
interest of justice that both state and federal courts will tend
to limit the sovereign immunities of public corporations. Pub-
lic corporations when organized for profit would seem to
have waived their sovereign immunity particularly when they
have property within the jurisdiction of the court.
The Constitution of the United States does not exclude the
jurisdiction of state courts over cases involving ambassadors,
public ministers and consuls. In Wilcox v. Lupo,1 86 the Su-
preme Court of California pointed out that Section 2 of Arti-
cle III of the Constitution of the United States which de-
clares that "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction", did not mean that the Supreme Court
had exclusive jurisdiction but that lower federal courts and
the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction according to the
will of Congress. The court held that the state court could
render judgment on a note made by the Consul General of
166. National City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356
(1955).
167. 91 N. T. L. 382, 103 A. 397 (1918).
168. 118 Cal. 639, 50 Pac. 758 (1897).
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Chile residing in San Francisco. In Redmond v. Smith,'0 9
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas reached a similar de-
cision. In Scott v. Hobe170 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held that the defendant who was vice-consul of Sweden and
Norway residing at St. Paul, Minnesota, was within the
jurisdiction of the Wisconsin courts because of a business
agreement entered into in Wisconsin. In De Give v. Grand
Rapids School Furniture Co.,'17 1 the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that the Belgian consul residing in Atlanta, Georgia,
could be sued in the state courts to recover an alleged debt.
Under the United States Constitution, the state courts also
have jurisdiction over criminal actions against consuls unless
Congress by statute has excluded state jurisdiction. In State
v. De La Foret,'172 the Constitutional Court of South Carolina
stated that the South Carolina courts in the absence of a con-
trary federal statute had criminal jurisdiction over the French
consul in Charleston. The defendant consul had been indicted
in the Circuit Court of Charleston for an assault and battery.
He pled to the jurisdiction of the court claiming diplomatic
immunity and his plea was sustained by the presiding judge.
Justice Huger in his learned opinion pointed out that consuls
were not diplomats and had only such immunities as were
granted by treaties. After pointing out that consuls did not
represent governments but were only commercial agents, the
justice learnedly quoted Vattel, Barbeyrac, Benkershoek, and
Martens to substantiate his opinion. Justice Huger knew and
understood international law. He also ruled that the federal
government did not have exclusive jurisdiction over such cases
since the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction according
to the Constitution, but that the defendant could not be
legally tried in the Supreme Court for the violation of state
law since the Supreme Court does not use a jury.
1 73
The United States Judicial Code of 1911,174 however, gave
exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors, public
ministers and consuls to federal courts. This exclusive juris-
diction in the federal courts was continued by the Judicial
Act of 1948.175 Justice Holmes in Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
169. 22 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 54 S. W. 636 (1899).
170. 108 Wis. 239, 84 N. W. 181 (1900).
171. 94 Ga. 605, 21 S. E. 582 (1894).
172. 2 Nott and McCord 217 (S. C. 1820).
173. Ibid.
174. 36 STAT. 1160 (1911) § 28; U. S. C. 371 (1952).
175. U. S. C. A. (1950) Title 28, § 1251; Act of June 25, 1948, Ch.
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Agler, 1 however, stated that it was not the intent of Con-
gress in the Judicial Act of 1911 to give exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal courts in divorce cases involving a foreign con-
sul since the matter of domestic relations was reserved to the
States by the United States Constitution. In this case, the
Vice-Consul of Roumania was seeking a divorce. It must be
supposed according to Justice Holmes' decision in the above
case that the same reasoning would apply to the Judiciary Act
of 1948, and that, therefore, a consul or his wife could still
bring a bill for divorcement into the state courts.
It can be seen from the cases cited, that a lawyer practicing
in the state courts may come upon numerous cases which will
involve a knowledge of international law. The study of inter-
national law in law schools is not merely a luxury; it is a
necessity, even though the lawyer practices exclusively in state
courts.
646; 62 STAT. 927. This section reads as follows: "(A) The Supreme
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: .... (2) All
actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers
of foreign states or their domestics or domestic servants, not incon-
sistent with the law of nations. (b) The Supreme Court shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceed-
ings brought by ambassadors or other public parties; .... " U. S. C. A.
(1950) Title 28, § 1351 states: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the States, of all actions and pro-
ceedings against consuls or vice consuls of foreign states. Act of June
25, 1948, c. 646, 62 STAT. 934 amended May 24, 1929, Ch. 139, § 80 (c),
63 STAT. 10. The amendment of May 24, 1949, amended this section by
substituting "of all actions and proceedings" in lieu of "of any civil
action".
176. 280 U. S. 379 (1930). For the decision in the state court see
119 Ohio St. 484, 164 N. E. 524 (1928).
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